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Abstract—It is common in the study of secure multicast
network coding in the presence of an eavesdropper that has
access to z network links, to assume that the source node is the
only node that generates random keys. In this setting, the secure
multicast rate is well understood. Computing the secure multicast
rate, or even the secure unicast rate, in the more general setting
in which all network nodes may generate (independent) random
keys is known to be as difficult as computing the (non-secure)
capacity of multiple-unicast network coding instances — a well
known open problem. This work treats an intermediate model
of secure unicast in which only one node can generate random
keys, however that node need not be the source node. The secure
communication rate for this setting is characterized again with
an eavesdropper that has access to z network links.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this work, we study secure network communication over
a directed acyclic network G = (V , E) having a single source
node S, a single terminal node T , and a single node K ,
which is capable of generating random “keys” independent
of the messages generated by S. We employ a notion of
secure “wiretap” communication networks introduced by Cai
and Yeung in [1] and studied further in, for example [2]–[6].
Under this notion of security, given a communication scheme
over G, we consider an edge e ∈ E of the network to be
secure in the presence of a wiretap adversary if and only if
I(M ;Xe) = 0, where M denotes the source message and
Xe denotes the information communicated on edge e.
1 To be
secure in the presence of an adversary that wiretaps any size-
z subset W = {e1, · · · , ez} ⊂ E of edges, we require that
I(M ;XW) = 0, where XW = (Xe1 , · · · , Xez).
Given integers R and z, we define a secure network code
over the network G to be (R, z)-feasible if it allows informa-
tion to be communicated from the source S to the terminal
T at rate R and, in addition, it secures the network against
a wiretap adversary that eavesdrops on up to z edges of the
network. Our work entails determining, for each z, the closure
of the set of rates that are (R, z)-feasible, thereby deriving the
capacity-security region.
When K = S, the capacity-security region for secure mul-
ticast network codes is well understood [1], [2] with several
follow up works [3]–[6] that address various methods to alter
any given non-secure linear network code into a new code that
is secure. In contrast, determining the capacity-security region
1Detailed definitions of all concepts discussed here and below appear in
Section II.
for secure network codes over a single-source single-terminal
network, where every node can generate random keys, is as
hard as the problem of characterizing the (non-secure) capacity
region of the k-unicast problem as shown by [7]. Results of a
similar nature are also presented in [8]. The k-unicast problem
is a well known open problem in the study of network codes
[8]–[12].
In this work, we seek to make progress in the apparently
difficult generalization from the scenario where only the source
can generate random keys to the scenario where all nodes can
generate keys by studying the case where only a single node
can generate keys but allowing that single node to be arbitrary.
Our central result is a characterization of the capacity-security
region in the unicast (single-source single-terminal) setting
when only a single network node K 6= S ∈ V can generate
random keys.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present our model and preliminary notation.
Our main result, the capacity-security characterization of the
networks at hand, appears in Section III. The characterization
is combinatorial in nature and involves different cut-set bounds
between the source node, the key generating node, and the
terminal node. Achievability is proven in Section IV via a
reduction from secure communication over G to (non-secure)
multi-source multi-cast network coding over a modified net-
work G∗ as shown in Figure 1b. The converse proof, which is
based on cutset bounds, appears in Section V. An additional
converse proof, in the more general context of cyclic networks,
is presented in Appendix A. The proofs of some one of our
lemmas and claims are presented in Appendix B and Appendix
C, respectively.
II. NETWORK MODEL
Our system model consists of the following components:
(a) A finite directed acyclic graph G = {V , E}. We assume
that each edge e ∈ E noiselessly transmits one unit of
information (i.e., one field element in a given field Fq) per
unit time. We use multiple edges to model an edge with
the ability to communicate more than one information
symbol per unit time.
(b) A source node S, which generates a source message
vector of length R, M =
[
M1 M2 · · · MR
]T
,
with M1,M2, · · · ,MR independently and uniformly dis-
tributed over the field Fq of size q.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1: (a) Network model G, and (b) the modified network
G∗ obtained from G by adding T ∗ and setting the demands at
T and T ∗ to (M,N).
(c) A terminal node T ∈ V , which is required to decode all
the messages generated by the source S with zero error.
(d) A node K ∈ V , which generates a random “key” vector,
N =
[
N1, · · · , N|N |
]T
with N1, · · · , N|N | indepen-
dently and uniformly distributed over the field Fq with
N independent of M .
(e) An eavesdropper that can access any subset W ⊂ E of
edges for which |W| ≤ z.
In the following subsections, we introduce our definition of
a network code and discuss the notions of topological order
and cut sets.
A. Network Code
We define a scalar linear network code N for the network G
to be an assignment of a linear encoding function fe to each
edge e ∈ E and a linear decoding function gT to terminal
T . For e ∈ E , we denote the edge message on e by Xe,
and for any set A ⊆ E , we define XA = {Xe : e ∈ A}.
If e ∈ E and e = (u, v) then the edge message Xe is a
linear combination of all the messages carried by the edges in
In(u) = {(w, u) : (w, u) ∈ E}, the incoming edges of u. The
edge message at e is obtained using local encoding at u. We
define Xe using the local encoding function f¯e on e = (u, v)
as
Xe = f¯e(XIn(u)) =
∑
e′∈In(u)
c¯e′,eXe′ . (1)
Here, Xe denotes the message on edge e, for each edge
e′ ∈ In(u), Xe′ denotes the messages on edges e′ and c¯e′,e
is the coefficient acting on each message Xe′ . If edge e is an
outgoing edge of S (or K), then Xe is a function of the source
messages (or keys) as well. Given, such a network code, an
adversary that wiretaps any size-z subset of edges W ⊂ E
would obtain the information XW on the wiretapped edges.
A network code is said to be (R, z)-feasible if
gT (XIn(T )) =M (2)
I(M ;XW) = 0, (3)
where T is the terminal node and M is the R-dimensional
message vector generated by the source S.
B. Topological Order
To achieve secure communication over the network G,
the source S must “mix” the message symbols in M with
the (received) random key symbols in N . This mixture of
messages and keys is communicated to the terminal T , which
must decode correctly to reconstruct message M . Let V =
{v0, ..., vn−1}. Since G is directed and acylic, we assume,
without loss of generality, that the nodes vi ∈ V are indexed
according to their topological order in G. This implies that the
node vi receives its incoming information only from nodes
v0, · · · , vi−1. We also assume that the index of K in this
topological order is less than that of S which in turn is less
than that of the terminal T . More specifically, we assume
K = v0, S = vm, and T = vn−1 for v0, vm, vn−1 ∈ V and
0 < m < n−1. There is no loss of generality in these assump-
tions as otherwise, either transmissions on outgoing edges of
S cannot be secure or the communication rate R between S
and T is zero. This implies that nodes {v0, . . . , vm−1} only
transmit, on their outgoing edges, functions of the information
generated by K while nodes {vm, . . . , vn−1} may potentially
transmit functions of the information generated at both S and
K .
C. The Cut Sets
For any pair of nodes u, v ∈ V , a cut is a set of edges in
E which, when removed, disconnects all paths from u to v.
The cut with the minimum capacity that separates u and v is
denoted as mincutG(u, v). Since each edge in E is assumed
to be of unit capacity, |mincutG(u, v)| represents the total
capacity of all the edges in mincutG(u, v). The cuts as defined
above may also separate sets of nodes in the network G. For
a subset of nodes A, the set mincutG(A, v) is the minimum
capacity cut that separates the set of nodes in A ⊂ V from the
node v ∈ V . For the network G, we use the following notation
CK−S = |mincutG(K,S)|
CK−T = |mincutG(K,T )|
CS−T = |mincutG(S, T )|
CKS−T = |mincutG({K,S}, T )|
III. RESULTS
In this work we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Given the directed acyclic network G and
integers R and z such that R > 0, there exists an (R, z)-
feasible network code N over G if and only if,
z ≤ min(CK−S , CK−T ) (4)
R ≤ CS−T (5)
R+ z ≤ CKS−T (6)
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into two parts, the
achievability proof, shown in Section IV, and the converse
proof shown in Section V.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: ACHIEVABILITY
Proof. For the network G = (E ,V) with source node S and
key generating node K holding R message symbols M and z
key symbols N respectively, we set the values of integers R
and z such that they satisfy the bounds (4), (5), and (6). We
implement a random linear network code N over G and over a
sufficiently large field Fq such that, for any edge e = (u, v) ∈
E , the local encoding coefficients {c¯e′,e}e′∈In(u) associated
with edge e, as described in (1), are i.i.d. and uniform over
Fq.
The network code N is said to be decodable at rate R over
network G, if it satisfies the condition of (2). We consider the
following lemma which we prove in Section VI-A.
Lemma 1. Given integers R, z that satisfy (4)-(6) of Theorem
1, the random linear network coding scheme N is decodable
at rate R with probability at least 1−
2(|E|+R+ z)2
q
.
We now consider a wiretapping adversary that can eaves-
drop on any subset of edges W ⊂ E such that |W| = z. We
denote the information gleaned by the adversary as XW which
may be expressed as
XW =
[
AW BW
] [M
N
]
(7)
Here, AW and BW are z×R and z× z matrices whose rows
are global encoding vectors associated with each edge in W ,
acting on M and N , respectively. We consider the network
coded information to be secure if and only if (3) holds for
any W ⊂ E of size z, i.e. the adversary gains no information
about the source message symbolsM even after wiretapping a
z-sized subset of edges in the network. In [3], Cai and Yeung
show that a linear network coding scheme is secure if and
only if the following condition holds.
rk(
[
AW BW
]
) = rk(BW ) (8)
Here, rk(.) denotes the rank of a matrix.
The following lemma is proven in Section VI-B by analyz-
ing the matrices AW and BW .
Lemma 2. Given integers R, z that satisfy (4)-(6) of Theorem
1, the random linear network coding scheme N over G is z-
secure with probability at least 1−
(
|E|
z
)
2z
q
for all wiretap sets
W ⊂ E of size z.
A network code is said to be (R, z)-feasible if it is both
R-feasible and z-secure. It now follows that, given integers R
and z that satisfy (4), (5), and (6), the suggested network code
is (R, z)-feasible with probability at least
(
1−
2(|E|+R+ z)2 +
(
|E|
z
)
2z
q
)
,
which, for sufficiently large q, implies our achievability with
high probability.

V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: CONVERSE
Proof. We prove the converse for any (not necessarily linear)
(R, z)-feasible network code N over the network G. We start
with an (R, z)-feasible coding scheme and show that R and
z satisfy the bounds of (4), (5) and (6). Here, we give a
partial proof in which we only address bound (4). Proofs of
a similar nature apply to the other bounds as well. Details
of the converse proof, in the more general context of cyclic
networks, appear in Appendix A.
We denote by CK−S the minimum cut separating K and S,
and by CK−S the total capacity of the edges in CK−S . The
random variableXK−S , over the support set XK−S , represents
the information on all edges of CK−S . We denote by W any
subset of z edges in E that is wiretapped by an eavesdropping
adversary. Then XW denotes the encoded information on all
the edges in W . We denote the set of edges that are incoming
to S as In(S), and the encoded information on all of the
edges in In(S) as XIn(s) with support set XIn(S). Similarly,
for Out(S).
For the bound z ≤ min(CK−S , CK−T ) we consider two
cases. First, assume by contradiction that z > CK−S . Specif-
ically set z = CK−S +1. This implies that the eavesdropping
adversary may choose to wiretap all the edges in CK−S
and an edge e ∈ Out(S) to obtain the wiretap set W =
CK−S ∪ {e} of size z. Then the wiretapped information is
XW = (XK−S , Xe), where Xe is the information on the
chosen edge e. Note that Xe = f¯e(XS), where, XS :=
(M,XIn(S)) is the information present at the source S.
For z-security, we require that the mutual information
I(M ;XW) = 0. Therefore,
I(M ;XW) = I(M ;XK−S) + I(M ;Xe|XK−S) = 0,
implying that, I(M ;XK−S) = 0 and I(M ;Xe|XK−S) = 0.
Thus, we conclude that H(Xe|XK−S) = H(Xe|XK−S,M).
Suppose that cut CK−S partitions G into disjoint sub-
networks A and A¯, where A includes the key generating node
K . Note that any information communicated through edges
in A¯ must be a function of XK−S . In addition, In(S) ⊂
CK−S ∪ EA¯, implying that all information reaching S is a
function of XK−S . We conclude, for any edge e ∈ Out(S),
that
Xe = he(M,XK−S), (9)
where, he is some deterministic function. Equation (9)
implies that H(Xe|XK−S,M) = 0 which in turn im-
plies H(Xe|XK−S) = 0. This means that to be z-secure
the information XK−S must completely determine Xe for
all e ∈ Out(S). Therefore, the information XOut(S) :=
{Xe}e∈Out(S) is also a deterministic function of XK−S . As
I(M ;XK−S) = 0 shows that XK−S is independent of M ,
it follows that XOut(S) is also independent of M and thus
I(M ;XOut(S)) = 0. This, in turn, implies that the rate
realizable by the network code N is R = 0 which is a
contradiction.
A similar proof holds for z ≤ CK−T , in which we study
the set W = CK−T ∪ {e} for any edge e ∈ In(T ). 
VI. PROOF OF LEMMAS
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We begin by considering the modified network G∗ =
(V∗, E∗), obtained from G as shown in Figure 1b. Specifically,
G∗ is obtained from G by adding a new node T ∗ and R + z
parallel edges from S to T ∗. As in G, the network G∗ has
nodes S and K holding R symbols of M and z symbols of
N , respectively. Here, the outgoing edges of S include those in
the original network G, denoted as Out(S), and the additional
R + z edges. Both terminals T and T ∗ want to decode all
R symbols of M and z symbols of N . A network code,
over G∗, that satisfies the demands of terminals T and T ∗
is a multi-source multicast network code which is R-feasible,
where R = (R, z).
We use a random linear multi-source multicast network code
N ∗ over network G∗ and the finite field Fq. In what follows,
we set some notation.
1. Let OK , |Out(K)|, IS , |In(S)| and OS , |Out(S)|.
2. The nodeK transmits z linear combinations ofN through
Out(K). We express the information on these edges as
XOut(K) = BKN . Here, the rows of BK , which is an
OK × z matrix, are the local encoding vectors associated
with each edge in Out(K). The entries of BK are i.i.d.
and uniform over the field Fq.
3. The message source S receives IS linear combinations of
N through the edges in In(S). We express the informa-
tion on these edges as XIn(S) = VIn(S)BKN . VIn(S)
is an IS × OK matrix, and the rows of VIn(S)BK are
the global encoding vectors, associated with each edge in
In(S), acting on N .
4. S “mixes" the received IS symbols of XIn(S) with the R
symbols of M and transmits the resulting combinations
through Out(S) and to T ∗. We express the information
on Out(S) as
XOut(S) =
[
AS BS
] [ M
VIn(S)BKN
]
=
[
AS BSVIn(S)BK
] [M
N
]
.
Here, the rows of the matrix
[
AS BS
]
are the local
encoding vectors associated with the edges in Out(S).
AS andBS are OS×R andOS×IS matrices respectively.
The entries of AS and BS are i.i.d. and uniform over Fq.
We now consider the following claims. Claim 2 is proven
in Appendix C-A.
Claim 1. The multi-source multicast random linear network
code N ∗, as described above, is R-feasible over the network
G∗ with probability at least 1−
2(|E|+R+ z)2
q
.
Proof of Claim 1. Given integers R and z, we start by ob-
serving the min-cut capacities in G∗ between the subsets of
the node set {S,K} and each terminal T and T ∗ as follows.
|mincutG∗(K,T )| = CK−T ≥ z (10)
|mincutG∗(K,T
∗)| = min(R + z, CK−S) ≥ z (11)
|mincutG∗(S, T
∗)| = R + z ≥ R (12)
|mincutG∗(S, T )| = CS−T ≥ R (13)
|mincutG∗({K,S}, T
∗)| = R+ z (14)
|mincutG∗({K,S}, T )| = CKS−T ≥ R+ z (15)
From (10)-(15), we see that for all source-terminal pairs in
G∗, the correspondingMin-Cut Max-Flow bounds are satisfied.
Let L be the total number of encoding coefficients employed
over all the edges in E∗. We can bound L by
∑
e∈E∗ |E
∗| ≤
|E∗|2 = (|E|+R+z)2. Using Theorem 8 of [13] and Theorem
5.4 of [14] (derived from [15]), we have that the network code
N ∗ is R-feasible over the network G∗ with probability at least
(
1−
2
q
)L
> 1−
2L
q
> 1−
2(|E|+R+ z)2
q
This proves the claim.

Claim 2. The R-feasible network code N ∗ over G∗, when
restricted to G, implies that N is R-decodable over G.
From Claim 1 and Claim 2, we have that the network code
N is R-decodable over G with probability at least
1−
2(|E|+R+ z)2
q
This proves the lemma. 
B. Proof of Lemma 2
We use the notation introduced in the proof of Lemma 1. For
any edge e ∈ E , we express the information on e as,
Xe = ue
[
XOut(K)
XOut(S)
]
= ue
[
0 BK
AS BSVIn(S)BK
] [
M
N
]
(16)
Here, ue is an edge-e encoding vector of dimension OK+OS ,
acting onXOut(K) andXOut(S). We partition ue =
[
uK uS
]
such that the OK-dimensional vector uK acts on the informa-
tion from Out(K) and the OS-dimensional vector uS acts
on the information from Out(S). Thus, we rewrite (16) as
follows.
Xe =
[
uK uS
] [ 0 BK
AS BSVIn(S)BK
] [
M
N
]
(17)
We now consider an adversary that wiretaps any subset
W ⊂ E of edges such that |W| = z. Then, using (17), we
obtain the information observed by the adversary as follows.
XW =
[
UK US
] [XOut(K)
XOut(S)
]
(18)
Here,
[
UK US
]
is a z× (OK +OS) matrix where UK is a
z × OK matrix and US is a z ×OS matrix. We assume that[
UK US
]
has full row-rank of z, as otherwise, the adversary
could simply drop an edge inW and not lose any information.
Using (17), we rewrite (18) as follows.
XW =
[
USAS UKBK +USBSVIn(S)BK
] [M
N
]
(19)
From (7) and (19), we have that
AW = USAS and BW =
[
UK +USBSVIn(S)
]
BK
Let,
Φ ,
[
UK +USBSVIn(S)
]
. (20)
From our decodability proof, we know that rk(VIn(S)) = z,
as otherwise, T ∗ could not have decoded the keys N . For the
security condition of (8) to hold, we show that rk(BW) =
rk(ΦBK) = z. Therefore, we compute the following.
Pr
BK ,BS
{rk(BW ) = z} =
Pr
BS
{rk(Φ) = z} Pr
BK
{rk(ΦBK) = z|rk(Φ) = z}. (21)
We now consider the following claims proven in Appendix
C-B and Appendix C-C, respectively.
Claim 3. PrBS{rk(Φ) = z} > 1−
z
q
Claim 4. Given an n ×m matrix A and an m × n matrix
B such that rk(A) = n and the entries of B are i.i.d. and
uniform over the field Fq, then rk(AB) = n with probability
at least 1−
n
q
, over B.
Let us consider the following event.
• EW : The condition of (8) holds for a given wiretap set
W of size z.
Using Claim 3 and Claim 4 we conclude from (21) that
Pr
BK ,BS
{EW} >
(
1−
z
q
)2
> 1−
2z
q
(22)
Denoting the complementary event of EW by E¯W and using
the union bound over event E¯W for any W ⊂ E of size z, we
have the following.
Pr{
⋃
W⊂E
E¯W} ≤
∑
W⊂E
2z
q
=
(
|E|
z
)
2z
q
.
Namely, the probability over the i.i.d. entries of BS and BK ,
of the network code being secure against an adversary with a
wiretap set W of size z is at least 1 −
(
|E|
z
)
2z
q
. This proves
the lemma. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we characterize the capacity-security region
for single unicast network codes over a directed acyclic
network in which only one node, which is not necessarily the
source node, can generate random keys. We present a random
linear achievability proof and a matching coverse proof. Our
converse can be extended to cyclic networks as well. (Details
appear in Appendix A.) Our work establishes an intermediate
step between the well understood problem of characterizing
the capacity-security region in which only the source node
generates random keys and the problem of characterizing the
capacity-security region when every node can generate random
keys.
Several problems are left open. An extension of our result
to the context of multicast network coding is within reach and
the subject of future research. It would also be interesting to
extend our achievability to single unicast network coding over
networks with cycles. Additional possible extensions include
the study of single unicast networks in which more than one
node can independently generate random keys.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: CONVERSE (FOR CYCLIC
NETWORKS)
Proof. We prove the converse for the more general setting of
directed networks Gcyc = (Vcyc, Ecyc) that may contain cycles.
As before, Gcyc has the message generating source node S, the
random key generating node K and the terminal T , as shown
in Figure 2. We show that for such a network and for any
network coding scheme, the bounds given in (4), (5) and (6)
are upper bounds for the capacity-security region.
As we address networks with cycles, we consider the notion
of time in our definition of a network code. Namely, we
consider an n-time step system. In such a system, we assume
that communication starts at time step i = 1. The source S
holds a messageM uniformly distributed in [qnR] and nodeK
holds random keys N uniformly distributed in [qRK ], where
RK is not restricted in any way. For any edge e ∈ E such that
e = (u, v), where u, v ∈ Vcyc, we define the information on e
at the i-th time step, for all i ∈ [n] = {1, · · · , n− 1}, as
X(i)e = f¯
(i)
e ({X
(j)
e′ }e′∈In(u),j∈[i−1]) (23)
Here, f¯
(i)
e is the time-variant local encoding function at edge
e at the i-th time step, In(u) denotes the set of incoming edges
in E to node u and [i− 1] = {1, · · · , i− 1}. In our work, we
consider X
(i)
e to be a random variable with the support set
Xe, for all i ∈ [n]. For a given cut C, we denote by X
(i)
C
the
composite of the variables corresponding to edges e ∈ C at
time step i, i.e. X
(i)
C
= ({X
(i)
e }e∈C). The support set of X
(i)
C
for all i ∈ [n] is denoted by XC. We use the notation X
[n]
e to
denote the information on edge e for the n-time step system,
i.e. X
[n]
e := {X
(j)
e }j∈[n].
For the network model Gcyc, the following definitions are
useful for the discussions that follow:
• For any cut Cu−v , separating any two nodes u, v ∈ V ,
we define two sub-networks A = (VA, EA) and A¯ =
(VA¯, EA¯), with u ∈ VA and v ∈ VA¯, as shown in Figure
2. Here, V = VA ∪ VA¯ and E = EA ∪ EA¯ ∪ Cu−v.
• We denote by CK−S , the minimum cut separating K and
S and by CK−S , the total capacity of the edges in CK−S .
The random variable X
(i)
K−S , over the support set XK−S ,
represents the information, at the i-th time step on all
the edges of CK−S . X
[n]
K−S = {X
[j]
K−S}j∈[n] represents
the information on all the edges of CK−S for the n-time
step system. We use similar notations for the time variant
random variables which represent the information on the
edges in CK−T , CS−T , and CKS−T .
• We denote by W any subset of z edges in E that is
wiretapped by an eavesdropping adversary. X
(i)
W denotes
the encoded information on all the edges in W at the i-
th time step. We assume that the wiretap set W is time
invariant, i.e. it does not change with the time step i.
Thus, the information obtained by the adversary for the
n-time step system is X
[n]
W .
• We denote by In(S), the set of edges that are incoming
to S. We denote the encoded information at the i-th time
step on all the edges in In(S) as X
(i)
In(s) with support set
XIn(S). Similarly, for Out(S).
• For any sub-graph A = (VA, EA) ⊂ Gcyc, let
Fig. 2: The partitioning of a network G due to the cut set
Cu−v.
SA := {S,K} ∩ VA. (24)
Given the definitions above, we start with an (R, z)-feasible
coding scheme and show that R and z satisfy the bounds
of (4), (5) and (6). Here, a scheme is (R, z)-feasible with
blocklength n if T can decodeM ∈ [qnR] and any wiretapped
subset of edge W hold no information on M . We shall
now consider each of the bounds separately in the following
subsections.
A. Bound on z: z ≤ min(CK−S , CK−T )
1) z ≤ CK−S: Suppose, by contradiction, that z > CK−S .
Particularly, assume z = CK−S + 1 This implies that the
eavesdropping adversary may choose to wiretap all the edges
in CK−S and an edge e ∈ Out(S) to obtain the wiretap set
W = CK−S ∪{e} of size z. Then the wiretapped information
is X
[n]
W = (X
[n]
K−S , X
[n]
e ), where X
[n]
e is the information on
the chosen edge e for the n-time step system. From (23), we
see that
X(i)e = f¯
(i)
e ({X
(j)
S }j∈[i−1])
= f¯ (i)e ({X
[i−1]
S }). (25)
Where, X
[i−1]
S := (M,X
[i−1]
In(S)) is the information present
at the source S for all time steps up to the (i − 1)-th time-
step. For z-security, we require that the mutual information
I(M ;X
(i)
W ) = 0. Therefore,
I(M ;X
[n]
W ) = I(M ;X
[n]
K−S) + I(M ;X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−S) = 0. (26)
Implying that,
I(M ;X
[n]
K−S) = 0, (27)
I(M ;X [n]e |X
[n]
K−S) = 0. (28)
From (28), we obtain the following.
H(X [n]e |X
[n]
K−S) = H(X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−S ,M). (29)
Suppose the cut CK−S partitions Gcyc into disjoint sub-
networks A and A¯ . Then, as per the definition in (24), SA¯ =
{S}. We denote by XA¯, the source messageM and/or key N
held by the nodes in A¯. We see that In(S) ⊂ CK−S ∪ EA¯,
which implies that any edge e′ ∈ In(S) either belongs to the
set In(S) ∩ CK−S or the set In(S) ∩ EA¯.
For any edge e′ ∈ In(S) ∩ CK−S , we observe that
X
[n]
e′ = he′(X
[n]
K−S), (30)
For e′ ∈ In(S) ∩ EA¯, we consider the following lemma
which we prove in Appendix B.
Lemma 3. For any cut C that partitions graph Gcyc into
disjoint sub-networks A and A¯, there exists, for any edge
e ∈ EA¯ and any time step i ∈ [n], a deterministic mapping
g
(i)
e such that g
(i)
e ({X
(j)
C
}j∈[i−1], XA¯) = X
(i)
e .
Therefore, using Lemma 3 for edge e′ ∈ In(S) ∩ EA¯:
X
[j]
e′ = g
(j)
e′ (M,X
[j−1]
K−S )
= h¯e′(M,X
[j−1]
K−S ), (31)
where, h¯e′ is a deterministic function.
Then, using (31) we obtain the information on In(S) as
follows.
X
[j−1]
In(S) = {X
[j−1]
e′ }e′∈In(S)∩CK−S ∪ {X
[j−1]
e′ }e′∈In(S)∩EA¯
= {he′(X
[j−1]
K−S )}e′∈In(S)∩CK−S
∪ {h¯e′(M,X
[j−2]
K−S )}e′∈In(S)∩EA¯
= h¯In(S)(M,X
[j−1]
K−S ). (32)
Thus, for the chosen edge e ∈ Out(S), using (32) and (25)
we have
X [n]e = {X
(j)
e }j∈[n]
= {f¯ (i)e (M,X
[j−1]
In(S))}j∈[n]
= {f¯ (i)e (M, h¯In(S)(M,X
[j−1]
K−S ))}j∈[n]
= f(M,X
[n−1]
K−S ). (33)
Thus, (33) shows that X
[n]
e is a deterministic function ofM
and X
[n−1]
K−S . As H(X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−S ,M) ≤ H(X
[n]
e |X
[n−1]
K−S ,M),
this implies that
H(X [n]e |X
[n]
K−S,M) = 0. (34)
Therefore by (29) and (34), we have,
H(X [n]e |X
[n]
K−S) = 0. (35)
Thus, to be z-secure, (35) shows that for all e ∈
Out(S), the random variable X
[n]
e must be completely de-
termined by X
[n]
K−S . Therefore, the information X
[n]
Out(S) :=
{X
[n]
e }e∈Out(S) is also a deterministic function of X
[n]
K−S . As
(27) shows that X
[n]
K−S is independent of the message symbols
M , it follows that X
[n]
Out(S) is also independent ofM and thus
I(M ;X
[n]
Out(S)) = 0. (36)
Equation (36), in turn implies that the rate realizable by the
network code N is R = 0 which is a contradiction.
2) z ≤ CK−T: Suppose, by contradiction, that z > CK−T ,
specifically assuming that z = CK−T+1. This implies that the
eavesdropping adversary may choose to wiretap all the edges
in CK−T and any edge e ∈ In(T ) to obtain the wiretapped set
W = CK−T ∪{e} of size z. Then the wiretapped information
is X
[n]
W = (X
[n]
K−T , X
[n]
e ), where X
[n]
e is the information on
the chosen edge e. For z-security, we require that the mutual
information I(M ;X
[n]
W ) = 0. Therefore,
I(M ;X
[n]
W ) = I(M ;X
[n]
K−T ) + I(M ;X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−T ) = 0. (37)
Further implying that,
I(M ;X
[n]
K−T ) = 0, (38)
I(M ;X [n]e |X
[n]
K−T ) = 0. (39)
From (39),
H(X [n]e |X
[n]
K−T ) = H(X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−T ,M). (40)
We now consider the cut CK−T and the corresponding
partitions A and A¯. Note that corresponding to the cut CK−T ,
the set of information and key generating source nodes in Gcyc
which are also present in A¯ is SA¯ where SA¯ ⊆ {S,K}.
Note that In(T ) ⊂ CK−T ∪ EA¯. Due to the cut CK−T , it
follows that either S ∈ VA¯ or S ∈ VA. For any edge e
′ ∈
In(T ) ∩ CK−T , we have the following.
X
[n]
e′ = he′(X
[n−1]
K−T ,M), (41)
where, he′ is a deterministic function.
For any edge e′ ∈ In(T ) ∪ EA¯, by Lemma 3, we have the
following.
X
[n]
e′ = {g
(j)
e′ (X
[j−1]
K−T ,M)}j∈[n]
= he′(X
[n−1]
K−T ,M). (42)
Equation (42) shows that for any edge e ∈ In(T ), the
random variableX
[n]
e is completely determined by X
[n−1]
K−T and
M . As H(X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−T ,M) ≤ H(X
[n]
e |X
[n−1]
K−T ,M), we have.
H(X [n]e |X
[n]
K−T ,M) = 0, (43)
which implies by (40) that H(X
[n]
e |X
[n]
K−T ) = 0. This holds
for all e ∈ In(T ) and thus H(XIn(T )|X
[n]
K−T ) = 0. As (38)
shows that X
[n]
K−T is independent ofM , therefore we conclude
that,
I(M ;X
[n]
In(T )) = 0. (44)
This in turn implies that the rate realizable by the net-
work code N is R = 0 which is a contradiction. Thus,
for R > 0, an (R, z)-feasible network code exists only if
z ≤ min(CK−S , CK−T ), i.e., bound (4) holds.
B. Upper Bound of R
The bound (5) is a direct consequence of Theorem 2.1 of
[14] and therefore the proof is not included here.
C. Upper Bound of R+ z: R + z ≤ CKS−T
To show that an (R, z)-feasible network code exists only if
bound (6) holds, we start by considering the following cases:
• Case 1: z ≥ CKS−T
• Case 2: z < CKS−T
For Case 1, we see that the eavesdropping adversary has the
option of wiretapping all the edges in CKS−T . Therefore, we
set CKS−T ⊆ W thereby forcing I(M ;X
[n]
KS−T ) = 0. This,
implies that X
[n]
KS−T is independent of the message symbols
M . We also observe that In(T ) ⊂ CKS−T ∪ EA¯. From our
previous discussions, we note that the random variable X
[n]
In(T )
is a deterministic function of X
[n]
KS−T and therefore is also
independentM . Thus, the terminal T receives no information
regarding the message symbols M and therefore the rate
realizable by the network code in this case is R = 0 which is
a contradiction.
For Case 2, let W ⊂ CKS−T . Then, CKS−T = W ∪WC
where, WC = CKS−T \ W . We denote the information on
the edges of the set WC as X
[n]
WC
and thus we have that
X
[n]
KS−T = (X
[n]
W , X
[n]
WC ) where H(X
[n]
WC ) ≤ n(CKS−T − z).
Here, our measure H(.) of entropy equals 1 for a uniform
random variable in Fq. Thus, we have the following.
nR = I(M ;X
[n]
KS−T ) (45)
= I(M ;X
[n]
W , X
[n]
WC )
= I(M ;X
[n]
W ) + I(M ;X
[n]
WC
|X
[n]
W )
= I(M ;X
[n]
WC |X
[n]
W ) (46)
= H(X
[n]
WC
|X
[n]
W )−H(X
[n]
WC
|X
[n]
W ,M)
≤ H(X
[n]
WC |X
[n]
W )
≤ H(X
[n]
WC
)
≤ n(CKS−T − z). (47)
Here, (45) is due to our assumption of correctly decoding
M and the min-cut max-flow theorem as the cut CKS−T is an
(S − T )-cut. (46) is due to the security condition. Thus, one
may realize an (R, z)-feasible network code over the network
Gcyc only if the bound (6) holds for integers R > 0 and z.
Combining our analysis for bounds (4), (5) and (6) proves
the theorem.

APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
We prove this lemma using an induction hypothesis on the
time step parameter i. At time i = 0, we assume that the
network edges do not carry any information. Thus, at time
i = 1, the information on all network edges in A¯ are solely a
function of the random variable XA¯.
We assume by induction that the hypothesis holds for 1 <
i ≤ I − 1, i.e. for i = I − 1, we have the following.
X(I−1)e = g
(I−1)
e ({X
(j)
C
}j∈[I−2], XA¯). (48)
We now consider time step i = I . For an edge e = (u, v),
X
(N)
e is a function of the incoming edges to u and XA¯ (the
latter only if u ∈ SA¯). Namely,
X(I)e = f
(I)
e ({X
(I−1)
e′ }e′∈In(u), XA¯).
For u ∈ VA¯, the incoming edges of u are either included in
the cut C or are in EA¯. Thus,
X(I)e = f
(I)
e (X
[I−1]
C
, {X
(I−1)
e′ }e′∈In(u), XA¯).
By induction, as X
(I−1)
e′ is a function of X
[I−2]
C
and XA¯ for
e′ ∈ EA¯. We conclude that there exists a function g
(I)
e such
that,
X(I)e = g
(I)
e (X
[I−1]
C
, XA¯).
This proves the lemma. 
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF CLAIMS
A. Proof of Claim 2
To prove that the network code N is R-decodable over
network G, given that N ∗ is R-feasible over G∗, we consider
the following steps.
1. We disconnect terminal T ∗ from S by removing the edges
connecting S to T ∗.
2. We keep the random assignment of the local coding
coefficients for each edge in E unchanged.
3. As in N ∗, the source S does not decode the keys N but
“mixes” the incoming combinations of the keys in N with
the message M that it holds, and transmits the resulting
combinations through Out(S).
4. The information that terminal T wants to decode also
remains unchanged.
By initiating the steps above, we obtain the network code
N from N ∗. It also follows that the network code N allows
T to decode all R symbols ofM as the R-feasible N ∗ allows
T to decode all R symbols ofM and z symbols of N , thereby
satisfying condition (2). This proves the claim. 
B. Proof of Claim 3
Since rk(
[
UK US
]
) = z, we assume, without loss of
generality, that the first σK columns ofUK and σS columns of
US are jointly linearly independent with σK +σS = z. Then,
we have that US =
[
U¯S U¯SΓ
]
, where U¯S is z×σS matrix
of full column-rank σS , and Γ is a σS × (OS − σS) matrix.
Let U¯K be the sub-matrix of UK containing the σK linearly
independent columns of UK , and ∆ be a σK × OK matrix
such that UK = U¯K∆. Then, as per our assumption, the first
σK columns ∆ form a σK × σK identity matrix. Therefore,
we have that rk(∆) = σK
We now consider the matrixVIn(S). Since, rk(VIn(S)) = z,
we may express VIn(S) as follows.
VIn(S) =
[
V V1
V2 V3
]
(49)
Here, V is a z × z invertible sub-matrix of VIn(S). The
columns of the z × (OK − z) sub-matrix V1 and the rows of
the (IS − z)× z sub-matrix V2 are spanned by the columns
and rows of V respectively, while the rows of the sub-matrix
V3 are spanned by the rows of V1. Thus we may rewrite (49)
as follows
VIn(S) =
[
V V1
AV V3
]
(50)
Here, A is an (IS − z) × z matrix. We now partition the
matrixBS =
[
BS,1 BS,2
]
such thatBS,1 andBS,2 are OS×
z and OS×(IS−z) matrices respectively. Let B , BSVIn(S),
then by using (50) we obtain the following.
B =
[
BS,1V +BS,2AV BS,1V1 +BS,2V3
]
,
[
B¯ B˜
]
(51)
Here, the matrices B¯ and B˜ are OS×z and OS× (IS −z),
respectively. Furthermore, we partition B¯ =
[
B¯1
B¯2
]
, where B¯1
and B¯2 are σS×z and (OS−σS)×z sub-matrices respectively.
Likewise, we partition B˜ =
[
B˜1
B˜2
]
. Then, using (50) and (51),
we may rewrite (20) as follows.
Φ =
[
U¯K U¯S
] ∆
B¯1 + ΓB¯2 B˜1 + ΓB˜2

 (52)
We now consider partition ∆ =
[
∆z ∆ˆ
]
, where ∆z
consists of the first z columns of ∆. Then, we have that
∆z =
[
IσK ∆¯z
]
where IK is the σK × σK identity matrix
and ∆¯z is a σK×(z−σK) matrix whose columns are spanned
by IσK . Thus, we see that the σK rows of ∆z are linearly
independent. We may rewrite (52) as follows.
Φ =
[
U¯K U¯S
]

 ∆z ∆ˆ
B¯1 + ΓB¯2 B˜1 + ΓB˜2


,
[
U¯K U¯S
]
Q (53)
Since
[
U¯K U¯S
]
is invertible, rk(Q) = z implies rk(Φ) =
z. To prove that rk(Q) = z, we show that the σS rows of
B¯1 +ΓB¯2, having dimension z, are linearly independent and
not spanned by the σK rows of ∆z .
Given that the entries of the matrix BS are i.i.d and uniform
in Fq, for any ψ ∈ Fzq and for i ∈ [OS ], we compute the
probability PrBS{(b¯)
i = ψ}, where (b¯)i denotes the i-th row
of B¯ of dimension z. From (51), we see that
(b¯i) = (bS,1)
iV + (BS,2A)
iV. (54)
Here, (bS,1)
i and (BS,2A)
i denotes the i-th row ofBS,1 and
BS,2A respectively. As V is invertible, we have the following.
Pr
BS
{(b¯)i = ψ} = Pr
(bS,1)i,BS,2
{(bS,1)
i + (BS,2A)
i = ψV−1}
=
∑
ψ¯
Pr
BS,2
{(BS,2A)
i = ψ¯}.
Pr
(bS,1)i
{(bS,1)
i = (ψV−1 − ψ¯)}
=
1
qz
∑
ψ¯
Pr
BS,2
{(BS,2A)
i = ψ¯} (55)
=
1
qz
(56)
Here, (55) is due to that fact that the entries of BS,1, which
is a sub-matrix of BS , are i.i.d. and uniform in Fq. From (56),
we see that the rows of B¯ are uniform in Fzq . For a fixed matrix
BS,2 in (54) and due to the invertibility of matrix V, there
exists a 1-1 map between (bS,1)
i ∈ Fzq and (b¯
i) ∈ Fzq , for all
i ∈ [OS ]. Now, as the vectors (bS,1)i are chosen independently
for each i ∈ [OS ], it follows that the corresponding vectors
(b¯i) must also be independent for all i ∈ [OS ]. This implies
that the rows of B¯1, which is a sub-matrix of B¯ containing
its first σS rows, are also i.i.d and uniform in F
z
q .
Let C , B¯1 + ΓB¯2 and ci denote the i-th row of C
for i ∈ [σS ]. For any ρ ∈ Fzq , we compute the probability
Pr
B¯
{ci = ρ}. Denoting the i-th rows of B¯1 and ΓB¯2 as (b¯1)i
and (ΓB¯2)i, respectively, we have that,
ci = (b¯1)i + (ΓB¯2)i.
Note that the rows of B¯1 form the first σS rows of B¯ and
therefore are i.i.d. and uniform in Fzq . Thus, by applying the
same argument as in (56), we obtain Pr
B¯
{ci = ρ} =
1
qz
.
The vectors {ci}i∈[OS ] are mutually independent due to the
fact that the vectors {(b¯1)i}i∈[OS ] are mutually independent.
Thus, as σK + σS = z, we have the following.
Pr
BS
{rk(Φ) = z} =
∏σS−1
l=0 q
z − qσK+l
qzσS
=
σS−1∏
l=0
(
1−
1
qz−σk−l
)
>
(
1−
1
q
)σS
> 1−
σS
q
> 1−
z
q
(57)
This proves our claim.

C. Proof of Claim 4
Let AB =
[
λ1 λ2 · · · λn
]
, where λj ∈ F
n
q for j ∈ [n],
A =
[
a1 a2 · · · am
]
, where ai ∈ Fnq for i ∈ [m] and
B = {bi,j}i∈[m],j∈[n], where bi,j’s are i.i.d. and uniform over
Fq.
For any j ∈ [n], we have
λj =
∑
i∈[m]
aibi,j (58)
For any ω ∈ Fnq , we first compute Prbj{λj = ω}, where
bj is the m-dimensional j-th column of B. Since rk(A) = n,
we assume, without loss of generality, that the last n columns
of A are linearly independent. We also partition bj such that
bj =
[
b¯j
b˜j
]
where b˜j consists of the last n entries of bj . Then,
we may rewrite (58) as
λj =
∑
i∈[m−n]
aibi,j +
m∑
i=m−n+1
aibi,j (59)
Then,
Pr
bj
{λj = ω} = Pr
bj
{
∑
i∈[m]
aibi,j = ω}
=
∑
ωˆ
Pr
b¯j
{
∑
i∈[m−n]
aibi,j = ωˆ}.
Pr
b˜j
{
m∑
i=m−n+1
aibi,j = ω − ωˆ} (60)
Since the n-dimensional columns {ai}mi=m−n+1 are linearly
independent, the n-system of equations
∑m
i=m−n+1 aibi,j =
ω − ωˆ must have a unique solution for each b˜j ∈ Fnq , and
as the entries of b˜j are i.i.d. uniform in Fq , we have that
Prb˜j{
∑m
i=m−n+1 aibi,j = ω − ωˆ} = 1/q
n. Thus, we may
rewrite (60) as follows.
Pr
bj
{λj = ω} =
1
qn
∑
ωˆ
Pr
b¯j
{
∑
i∈[m−n]
aibi,j = ωˆ}
=
1
qn
(61)
Equation (61) implies that the columns {λj}j∈[n] are uni-
form in Fnq . The columns λj are also mutually independent
due to the fact that the columns bj are independent for all
j ∈ [n]. Thus, we have
Pr
B
{rk(AB) = n} =
∏n−1
l=0
(
qn − ql
)
qn2
=
n−1∏
l=0
(
1−
1
qn−l
)
>
(
1−
1
q
)n
> 1−
n
q
(62)
This proves the claim.

